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BRADY AND JAILHOUSE SNITCHES
Paul C. Giannellit
"The most dangerous informer of all is the jailhouse snitch
who claims another prisoner has corifessed to him. " 1
INTRODUCTION

This essay is a byproduct of my work with the American Bar
Association's Innocence Committee, which made a number of
recommendations to prevent miscarriages of justice in the future? I
was asked to write portions of a report on jailhouse snitches and
became intrigued by their extensive use in some jurisdictions. 3 More
recently, I had the opportunity to read John Grisham's book, The
Innocent Man, which tells the story of Ron Williamson. 4

t Albert J. Weatherhead III & Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case Western
Reserve University.
I
Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 1381, 1394 (1996).
2 See REPORT OF THE ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION'S AD Hoc INNOCENCE
COMMITTEE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRJMINAL PROCESS, ACHIEVING JUSTICE:
FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUlL TY (Paul C. Giannelli & Myrna Raeder eds.,
2006) [hereinafter INNOCENCE REPORT]. The Committee was tasked with undertaking a review
of the causes for wrongful convictions and reconunending policies to better ensure that
individuals will not be convicted of crimes they did not commit. Over a three-year period, the
Committee drafted resolutions and accompanying reports that have now been adopted by the
ABA House of Delegates. In addition to a resolution on jailhouse informants, the ABA adopted
resolutions on false confessions, eyewitness identification procedures, forensic evidence,
defense connsel practices, investigative policies and personnel, prosecution practices, systemic
remedies, and compensation for the wrongfully convicted. These included recommendations for
videotaping all interrogations, accrediting crime laboratories, conducting double-blind lineups,
and requiring corroboration in all cases involving jailhouse snitches.
3 See Symposium, The Cooperating Witness Conundrum: Is Justice Obtainable?, 23
CARDOZO L. REv. 747 (2002).
4 JOHN GRISHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN: MURDER AND INJUSTICE IN A SMALL TOWN
(2006).
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Williamson's capital murder conviction rested on the testimony of a
jailhouse informant and hair evidence, often a lethal combination. 5
This was Grisham's first nonfiction work, and he explains why he
wrote the book: "Not in my most creative moment could I conjure up
a story as rich and as layered as Ron's." 6 Indeed, Williamson's story
is riveting but also tragic. Five days before his scheduled execution, a
federal judge granted his petition for habeas relieC A jailhouse
snitch, Terri Holland, was the key prosecution witness. She was
awaiting trial for her third felony conviction8 when she purportedly
heard Williamson's incriminatory remarks. 9 This was not Holland's
first appearance as a jailhouse snitch; she also allegedly overheard
incriminating statements in an unrelated murder case. 10 The
Williamson case was also the focus of a chapter in Actual Innocence,
a book by Jim Dwyer, Peter Neufeld, and Barry Scheele, which
examined sixty-two of the first DNA exonerations secured through
Cardozo Law School's Innocence Project. They wrote: "During her
four-month bit in the county jail, ... Terri Holland had solved the
two most heinous murders in the modem history of Ada, Oklahoma,
by taking confessions from two complete strangers. " 11
5 ln Ron Williamson's habeas case, the federal district court correctly noted that the hair
expert's testimony lacked scientific support; the court was "unsuccessful in its attempts to locate
any indication that expert hair comparison testimony meets any of the requirements of
Daubert." Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1558 (E.D. Old. 1995), ajf'd sub nom.
Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508 (lOth Cir. 1997). The court further observed: "Although the
hair expert may have followed procedures accepted in the community of hair experts, the human
hair comparison results in this case were, nonetheless, scientifically unreliable." !d.
Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit reversed on this issue. Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508,
1523 (I Oth Cir. 1997) (holding that the due process standard, not Daubert, applies in habeas
proceedings). See also Paul C. Giannelli & Emmie West, Hair Comparison Evidence, 37 CRIM.
L. BULL. 514 (2001) (discussing the DNA exoneration cases in which hair evidence was used to
convict the innocent); Clive A. Smith & Patrick D. Goodman, Forensic Hair Comparison
Analysis: Nineteenth Centwy Science or Twentieth Century Snake Oil?, 27 COLVN!. HUM. RTS.
L. REv. 227, 231 (1996) ("If the purveyors of this dubious science cannot do a better job of
validating hair analysis than they have done so far, forensic hair comparison analysis should be
excluded altogether from criminal trials.").
6 GRISHAM, supra note 4, at 355.
7
Williamson, 904 F. Supp. 1529.
8 !d. at 1550 ("Another troubling aspect of this case concerns the motivation of one of the
State's most important witnesses, Terri Holland. Holland's testimony provided the only
evidence of straightforward admissions of guilt by Petitioner. ... According to her testimony,
she had three felony convictions, one being a federal conviction for conspiracy to defraud the
federal government, another for forgery, and the last for passing bogus checks.").
9 !d. at 1551 ("Holland claims that during that incarceration she heard not only
Petitioner's confession for the murder of Ms. Carter, but also Karl Allen Fontenot's confession
for the murder of Donna Haraway.") (citations omitted).
10 GRISHAM, supra note 4, at 152 ("The prosecution's star was the amazing Terri Holland.
From October 1984 to January 1985, Holland had been locked up in the Pontotoc County jail for
writing bad checks. As far as unsolved murders went in Oklahoma, it was a productive and
remarkable four-month stay.").
11 JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER
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Moreover, Holland failed to mention Williamson's "admission"
for over a year. 12 Incredibly, "Holland denied she ever received a.ny
compensation or promises of leniency from the State in return for her
testimony in either [murder case]." 13 Another prisoner, Glen Gore,
who also testified against Williamson, would later be proved the
actual killer through DNA evidence. At the end of his opinion
granting Williamson habeas relief, which was rendered before the
exculpatory DNA tests were performed, Chief Judge Seay wrote:
"God help us, if ever in this great country we turn our heads while
people who have not had fair trials are executed. That almost
happened in this case." 14
I. THE PROBLEM

Of the sixty-two cases examined by the Innocence Project, twentyone percent involved snitches or informants. 15 According to the
Center for Wrongful Convictions, snitch cases account for 45.9% of
the 111 death row exonerations since the death penalty was restored
in the 1970s. 16 Of the 117 death penalty appeals pending in the
California State Public Defender's office, seventeen involved
testimony by in-custody informants and six by informants in
constructive custody. 17
Jailhouse infonnant testimony also played a pivotal role in the
wrongful conviction of Guy Paul Morin in Canada: "Such testimony
related to a purported confession to the murder, made by Mr. Morin
to a fellow inmate at the jail, Robert Dan May. The confession was
allegedly heard by a second inmate in an adjoining cell who also

DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 135 (2000).
12 Williamson, 904 F. Supp. at 1551 ("Holland testified that she did not inform the district
attorney's office of Petitioner's alleged confession until February 1986, because she assumed
that other personnel in the jail were already aware of his statements. However, no such reporting
delay occurred in Mr. Fontenot's case, since she testified against him as early as his preliminary
hearing in January 1985.") (citations omitted).
13 Jd.
14 Jd at 1577.
15 DWYER ET AL., supra note 11, at 246. See also John M. Broder, Starting Over, 24 Years
After a Wrongful Conviction, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2004, at Al4 ("Mr. Goldstein was able to
establish conclusively that Mr. Fink, a habitual criminal, heroin addict and serial liar, had
fabricated his account of Mr. Goldstein's 'confession' to him when they were together briefly in
a Long Beach police holding pen.").
16 CENTER ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, THE SNITCH SYSTEM 3 (Northwestern
University School of Law 2004) (most were jailliouse informants).
17 Vesna JakSic, Calif. May Crack Down on Use ofJailhouse Informants, NAT'L L.J., Jan.
1, 2007, at 6 (reporting that the California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice
issued guidelines on the use of jailliouse informants).
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testified at the hial. " 18 Morin was later freed due to DNA testing; hair
evidence also played a pivotal role in his case. 19
Another Canadian case involved Thomas Sophonow. In addition to
three jailhouse informants who testified for the prosecution, nine
others volunteered. One was Terry Arnold, who is now a suspect in
the killing. Of the testifying infmmants, Thomas Cheng had twentysix counts of fraud dismissed in exchange for his testimony. Adrian
McQuade, a career informant, was the second witness. Upon his
arrest as a material witness, McQuade threatened to commit petjury if
not released. Records never disclosed to the defense revealed that
while he offered to be placed in jail with Sophonow, he did not hear a
confession. The Commissioner who investigated Sophonow's
wrongful conviction described the third informant, Douglas Martin,
as "a prime example of the convincing mendacity of jailhouse
informants. He seems to have heard more confessions than many
dedicated priests."20 With a record for petjury, he had testified as a
jailhouse informant in at least nine cases. 21
Problems with jailhouse informants, however, predate the recent
DNA exonerations. One of the most notorious examples involved
Leslie Vernon White, who, on 60 Minutes, "admitted to consistently
fabricating confessions of fellow inmates and offering perjured
testimony to courts."22 White testified against at least a dozen
inmates; in "one thirty-six day period, he gave evidence for the Los
Angeles dishict attorney's office in three murder cases and one
residential burglary-all arising from what he claimed were fleeting
jailhouse encounters during which inmates revealed critical details
about the crimes to him. " 23 A grand jury investigating the matter
18 Steven Skurka, A Canadian Perspective on the Role of Cooperators and Infonnants, 23
CARDOZO L. REv. 759, 761 (2002).
19 See HON. FRED KAUFMAN, THE COMMISSION ON PROCEEDINGS lNVOL VING GUY PAUL
MoRIN (Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, 1998) [hereinafter KAUFMAN REPORT),
available at http://www.attomeygeneraljus.gov.on.ca!english/about/pubs/morin/
(Recommendation 2: "Tria! judges should undertake a more critical analysis of the admissibility
of hair comparison evidence as circumstantial evidence of guilt.").
20 MANITOBA JUSTICE, THE INQUIRY REGARDING THOMAS SOPHONOW (2001), available
at http://www.gov.mb.ca/justice/pubications/sophonow/jailhust/martin.html.
21 Richard J. Wolson & Aaron M. London, The Structure, Operation, and Impact of

Wrongful Conviction Inquires: The Sophonow Inquiry as an Example of the Canadian
Experience, 52 DRAKEL. REv. 677,682 (2004).
2 2 ROBERT M. BLOOM, RATTING: THE USE AND ABUSE OF INFORMANTS IN THE
AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 65 (2002). "[White's] exploits were documented in a 1989 segment
of 60 Minutes and resulted in a Los Angeles County grand jury investigation on the use of
jailhouse informants." Id at 64. See also Robert Reinhold, Califomia Shaken Over an Informer,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1989, at AI ("Defense lawyers have compiled a list of 225 people
convicted of murder and other felonies, some sentenced to death, in cases in which Mr. White
and other jailhouse informers testified over the last lO years in Los Angeles County.").
2 3 DWYER ET AL., supra note I I, at 128. In a different passage, they write: "Another
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concluded that the Sheriff's Department "failed to establish adequate
procedures to control improper placement of inmates with the
foreseeable result that false claims of confessions or admissions
would be made."24 Similarly, the District Attorney's Office "failed to
fulfill the ethical responsibilities required of a public prosecutor by its
deliberate and informed declination to take the action necessary to
curtail the misuse of jail house informant testirnony."25
Courts have also recognized this problem. A former prosecutor,
Judge Trott of the Ninth Circuit, has commented:
Never has it been more true than it is now that a criminal
charged with a serious crime understands that a fast and easy
way out of trouble with the law is not only to have the best
lawyer money can buy or the court can appoint, but to cut a
deal at someone else's expense and to purchase leniency from
the government by offering testimony in return for immunity,
or in return for reduced incarceration. 26
The Supreme Court has made similar comments concerning
accomplices, cautioning that "the evidence of such a witness ought to
be received with suspicion, and with the very greatest care and
caution, and ought not to be passed upon by the jury under the same
mles governing other and apparently credible witnesses." 27 Justice

inmate, Sydney Stroch, was the 'Snitch Professor' who had supplied police with twenty
'confessions' he claimed to have heard while locked up. He was a witness in court at least a
half-dozen times." Jd at 129.
24 REPORT OF THE 1989-90 LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY: INVESTIGATION OF ]AIL
HOUSE INFORMANTS rN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM rN LOS ANGELES COUNTY 6 (June 26,
1990).
25 Jd.
2 6 N. Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 1123 (9th Cir. 2001). He elaborated:
[B]ecause of the perverse and mercurial natnre of the devils with whom the criminal
justice system has chosen to deal, each contract for testimony is fraught with the real
peril that the proffered testimony will not be truthful, but simply factually contrived
to "get" a target of sufficient interest to induce concessions from the government
Defendants or suspects with nothing to sell sometimes embark on a methodical
journey to manufacture evidence and to create something of value, setting up and
betraying friends, relatives, and cellmates alike. Frequently, and because they are
aware of the low value of their credibility, criminals will even go so far as to create
corroboration for their lies by recruiting others into the plot, a circumstance we
appear to confront in this case.
I d. at 1124. Judge Trott had previously written on this subject. See Trott, supra note L
27 Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 204 (1909). See also Bennett L. Gershman,
Witness Coaching by Prosecutors, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 829, 847 (2002) ("The cooperating
witness is probably the most dangerous prosecution witness of all. No other witness has such an
extraordinary incentive to lie. Furthermore, no other witness bas the capacity to manipulate,
mislead, and deceive his investigative and prosecutorial handlers. For the prosecutor, the
cooperating witness provides the most damaging evidence against a defendant, is capable of
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Jackson put it this way a half-century ago: "The use of informers,
accessories, accomplices, false friends, or any of the other betrayals
which are 'dirty business' may raise senous questions of
credibility."28 Yet, unlike jailhouse informants, statements of
accomplices can often be corroborated with other evidence. 29
II. CREDIBILITY

A jurisdiction could prohibit informant/accomplice testimony
entirely. The Sophonow Commission in Canada came close to this
position, recommending that "(a]s a general rule, jailhouse informants
should be prohibited from testifying." 30 Alternatively, a jurisdiction
could subject such testimony to an exclusionary rule, as Illinois
presently does in capital cases involving jailhouse infonnants. 31 If
neither of these approaches is adopted, the decision regarding the
reliability of this type of testimony is entrusted to the trier of fact,
which cannot do its job unless it is fully informed of matters that
affect the witness's credibility.
Many of the Supreme Court's right of confrontation cases involved
witnesses who have received or may receive benefits from the
prosecution. For example, in Davis v. Alaska, 32 the defense attempted
to show that a key prosecution witness was a juvenile probationer and
therefore had a motive-retention of his probationary status-to
testify in a way favorable to the prosecution. The trial judge, based on
a statute, excluded this evidence. The Supreme Court reversed: "The
State's policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile
offender's record cannot require yielding of so vital a constitutional
right as the effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse
witness. " 33

lying convincingly, and typically is believed by the jury.").
2B On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 757 (1952).
29 For a definition of jailhouse informant, see 725 ILL. CaMP. STAT. ANN.§ 5/115-2l(a)
(West 2004) ("For the purposes of this Section, 'informant' means someone who is purporting
to testify about admissions made to him or her by the accused while incarcerated in a penal
institution contemporaneously.").
30 Wolson & London, supra note 21, at 689.
31 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/1 15-2l(d) (West 2004) (based ou REPORT OF THE
GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, Recommendation 52 (April 2002)). See also
George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP. L.
REv. 1, 61--62 (2000).
n 415 U.S. 308 (!974).
33 Id at 320. Similarly, in Delaware v. VanArsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), the Court wrote:
"[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was
prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a
prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness [questions about the dismissal of a criminal
charge], and thereby 'to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors could appropriately
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III. BRADY

Disclosure of impeachment evidence is constitutionally required
under Brady v. Ma;ylancf 4- i f it is material. In Giglio v. United
States/ 5 the Supreme Court held: "When the 'reliability of a given
witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,'
nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within this
[Brady] rule." 36 Indeed, the Court's most recent Brady case, Banks v.
Dretke, 37 involved the failure to disclose that a prosecution witness
was a paid informant.
A. Materiality Requirement
The Supreme Court undercut the effectiveness of the Brady rule
when it began to create a stringent materiality requirement. The word
"materiality" is a term of art in this context. It is not used in the same
sense as in evidence law, where it simply means an issue of
consequence under the substantive law. 38 In the Brady context, it
means "outcome determinative. " 39

draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.'" Id. at 680 (quoting Dmds, 415 U.S. at
318). See also Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692 (1931) (defense counsel not permitted
to question witness about present residence, which was under the control of federal authorities;
"Prejudice ensues from a denial of the opportunity to place the witness in his proper setting and
put the weight of his testimony and his credibility to a test, without which the jury cannot fairly
appraise them. To say that prejudice can be established only by showing that the crossexamination, if pursued, would necessarily have brought out facts tending to discredit the
testimony in chief, is to deny a substantial right and withdraw one of the safeguards essential to
a fair trial.") (citations omitted).
34 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See also Barbara Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an
Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133 (1982) (arguing that
limiting the application of Brady is a natural evolution of and best serves the adversary system);
Elizabeth N. Dewar, Note, A Fair Trial Remedy for Brady Violations, 115 YALE L.J. 1450
(2006) (arguing that criminal defendants should be able to argue that failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence raises reasonable doubt); Robert Hochman, Note, Brady v. Maryland and
the Search for Truth in Criminal Trials, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1673 (1996) (arguing that Brady
imposes duties not only on prosecutors but all state actors).
35 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972) ("[T]he Government's case depended almost entirely on
Taliento 's testimony; without it there could have been no indictment and no evidence to carry
the case to the jury. Taliento's credibility as a witness was therefore an important issue in the
case, and evidence of any understanding or agreement as to a future prosecution would be
relevant to his credibility and the jury was entitled to know of it.").
36 Id. at 154.
3 7 540 U.S. 668, 703 (2004) ("[A]s to the suppression of Farr's informant status and its
bearing on 'the reliability of the jury's verdict regarding punishment,' all three elements of a
Brady claim are satisfied.") (citations omitted).
38 See FED. R. Evm. 401.
39 The suppressed evidence is material "only if there is a reasonable probability that, had
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). See Bennett L. Gershman,
Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 689-90 (2006) ("The most
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The Court could have adopted a different approach. Instead of a
demanding "materiality" standard, the Court could have used the
traditional harmless error analysis. 40 Dissenting in United States v.
Bagley, 41 Justice Marshall advocated this position: "By adhering to
the view ... that there is no constitutional duty to disclose evidence
unless nondisclosure would have a certain impact on the trial
[materiality]-the Court pennits prosecutors to withhold with
impunity large amounts. of undeniably favorable evidence, and it
imposes on prosecutors the burden to identify and disclose evidence
pursuant to a pretrial standard that virtually defies definition. " 42
Under Justice Marshall's approach, the prosecution would be
required to tum over all exculpatory evidence (whether or not
material); if the prosecution failed in this obligation, the constitutional
violation would be subject to harmless error analysis. 43 Under this
approach, the prosecution would have the burden of establishing
hannless error beyond a reasonable doubt, 44 rather than the defense
attempting to demonstrate "materiality."45 The Court has adopted a
similar approach to ineffective assistance claims, with the same
disastrous effect. 46

pernicious consequence of the judiciary's radical reconstruction of the concept of materiality
has been to afford prosecutors an extraordinarily wide berth to conceal favorable evidence from
the defense in the completely rational expectation that the suppression either will not be
discovered or, if discovered, will be found by a reviewing court to not be material.").
4° Once a reviewing court has found constitutional error, "there is no need for further
harmless-error review." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,435 (1995).
41 473 U.S. at 682.
42 !d. at 700 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He further commented:
Once the prosecutor suspects that certain information might have favorable
implications for the defense, either because it is potentially exculpatory or relevant to
credibility, I see no reason why he should not be required to disclose it. After all,
favorable evidence indisputably enhances the truth-seeking process at trial. And it is
the job of the defense, not the prosecution, to decide whether and in what way to use
arguably favorable evidence. In addition, to require disclosure of all evidence that
might reasonably be considered favorable to the defendant would have the
precautionary effect of assuring that no information of potential consequence is
mistakenly overlooked. By requiring full disclosure of favorable evidence in this
way, courts could begin to assure that a possibly dispositive piece of information is
not withheld from the trier of fact by a prosecutor who is torn between the two roles
he must play. A clear rule of this kind, coupled with a presumption in favor of
disclosure, also would facilitate the prosecutor's admittedly difficult task by
removing a substantial amount of unguided discretion.
!d. at 698.
43 See United Slates v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 117-18 (1976) (Marshall & Brennan, J. J.,
dissenting).
44 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (!967).
45 See 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.3 (2d ed. 1999).
4 6 The "materiality" requirement in Brady functions much like the "prejudice"
requirement in the ineffective assistance of counsel cases. See 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 45,
§ 27.6{d), at 947 ("An additional group of violations were destined not be analyzed under the
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B. Prosecutor's Decision

Another underappreciated aspect is the psychological posture in
which the prosecutor finds herself when confronting Brady issues.
Here, I believe the lack of trial experience by the members of the
Supreme Court has had an impact. After law school, I tried cases in
the Army-first as a prosecutor, then as defense counsel, and then
once again as a prosecutor. I came to understand how legal rules
worked in practice as well as the pressures generated by those rules.
As a prosecutor, I could easily be righteous, seeing myself as the
instrument of justice seeking redress for rape and homicide victims,
and protecting the public from predators. Once a defense attorney, I
changed my psychological mindset overnight. I could be equally
righteous when I believed my client was innocent, but more typically,
I would be disturbed because the prosecution had overcharged my
client, or violated his rights in securing a confession, or made a deal
with an accomplice who was far more culpable. In short, the abstract
notion of the "adversary system" that I had studied in law school
became a living, driving force in my professional life. With that
understanding, lets look at the context in which Brady decisions are
made.
First, a prosecutor knows that she has a very high burden of
persuasion-proof beyond a reasonable doubt-and, in most
jurisdictions, must obtain a unanimous verdict from twelve jurors. 47
One juror holdout can "hang" a jury, and most defense counsel
consider a hung jury, even though it will result in a mistrial and
possible retrial, a victory. 48
Second, the prosecutor knows she gets only one shot at a
conviction. An acquittal will foreclose an appeal, due to the Supreme ·
Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence. 49 In contrast, a conviction and
reversal on appeal does not preclude a retrial. 5°
Third, if the prosecutor believed the accused was i1mocent,
virtually all prosecutors would dismiss the case. Thus, Brady issues
arise in cases where the prosecutor believes the defendant is guilty.
The Williamson case illustrates the power of this prosecutorial belief.

Chapman's hannless error test because they were harmful by definition .... Examples include
a fmding that counsel's representation was ineffective . . . or that nondisclosed exculpatory
evidence was material ....").
47 See 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 45, § 22.l(e) (discussing unanimity requirement).
48 There are, of course, cases in which the evidence is overwhelming, but they tend to
result in a plea bargain.
49 See 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 45, § 25.3(b) (discussing effects of acquittal).
50 See id., § 25.4(a).
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After Williamson succeeded in securing habeas relief, he sought
DNA testing. Grisham writes: "Bill Peterson [the prosecutor] liked
the idea of DNA testing. He had never wavered in his belief that
Williamson was the killer, and now it could be proven with real
science."51 Even after the DNA tests exonerated Williamson, the
prosecutor's mind did not change. Grisham observes: "Peterson was
still convinced Ron Williamson had raped and murdered Debbie
Carter, and his evidence had not changed. Forget the DNA."52 With
this mind set, the prosecutor must determine whether evidence is
"favorable" and "materia1."53 In these circumstances, it is not difficult
for the prosecutor to convince herself that evidence is "neutral" rather
than "favorable" or not outcome determinative ("material"). 54
Fourth, apparently prosecutors are not particularly good at
assessing the credibility of their infonnants. The little empirical data
on the subject indicate that there is often difficulty in screening out
unreliable informant testimony. One prominent researcher
commented:
Surprisingly, however, professionals who regularly make
these kinds of [truth-determination] judgments for a living,
like the rest of us, are highly prone to error. In one study,
researchers Paul Ekman and Maureen O'Sullivan were
curious to know whether groups of so-called experts-such
as police investigators; CIA, FBI, and military polygraph
examiners; trial judges; psychiatrists; and U.S. Secret Service
Agents-are truly better than the average person. Using
stimulus materials from past studies-consisting of true and
false stories-they found that college students had a 52.8
percent accuracy rate, which is pretty typical. Police
detectives were only slightly higher, at 55.8 percent; CIA,
FBI, and military polygraph examiners were at 55.7 percent,
trial judges were at 56.7 percent, and psychiatrists were at
GRISHAM, supra note 4, at 288.
!d. at 302.
53 For a discussion of Brady issues involving scientific evidence, see Paul C. Giannelli,
Criminal Discove1y, Scientific Evidence, and DNA, 44 VAND. L. REV. 79 I (!991).
54 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 117 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he rule reinforces the natural
tendency of the prosecutor to overlook evidence favorable to the defense, and creates an
incentive for tbe prosecutor to resolve close questions of disclosure in favor of concealment.");
Daniel J. Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs Problems of
Prosecutorial Discretion and Retrospective Review, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 39!, 394-95 (1984)
(arguing that since a prosecutor is "an understandably biased party," it is a "nearly impossible
task" for a prosecutor to determine objectively what evidence is favorable to a defendant);
Gershman, supra note 39, at 708 ("Moreover, for prosecutors, whose natural instincts are to
discount any rule that would require tbern to assist a defendant in defeating the prosecutor's
case, the Brady rule became an obstacle to be avoided or subverted.").
51

52

2007]

BRADY AND JAILHOUSE SNITCHES

603

57.6 percent. U.S. Secret Service Agents won the prize,
exhibiting a 64 percent accuracy rate, the highest of all
groups. 55
Fifth, the prosecutor knows that there is little chance that her
decision will be revealed; neither the judge nor defense counsel will
automatically review the prosecutor's decision. Every time I read a
case involving a Brady issue, I want to know how the exculpatory
information surfaced. How did the defense counsel learn of the
evidence? Sometimes, a convict files a freedom of information act
request. 56 Sometimes the information comes out after a request for
DNA testing is made. 57 At other times, the information is revealed in
a related case. 58 I suspect it is rarely revealed by the original
prosecutor, who has already found it non-material or non-exculpatory.
In sum, Brady depends on the self-regulation of prosecutors.
Finally, sanctions for Brady violations appear to be illusory. As
one scholar, who has researched disciplinary actions against
55 Saul M. Kassin, Human Judges af Truth, Deception, and Credibility: Confident But
Erroneous, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 809, 811 (2002). See also Christian A. Meissner & Saul M.
Kassin, "He's guilty!": Investigator Bias in Judgments of Truth and Deception, 26 LAW & HUM.
BEHA v. 469, 470 (2002) ("Unfortunately, psychological research has generally failed to support
the claim that individuals can attain high levels of performance in making judgments of truth
and deception. Over the years, numerous studies have demonstrated that individuals perform at
no better than chance level in detecting deception."); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with
Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Tntth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REv.
917, 953 (1999) (reporting a study based on interviews with former Assistant U.S. Attorneys:
"Four AUSAs expressed the belief that, due to a host of factors, most prosecutors are 'horrible'
at the cooperation process and many, unwittingly, obtain false information."). See also
Gershman, supra note 27, at 848-49 ("Some prosecutors trust their cooperators too much--one
former prosecutor described the relationship as 'falling in love with your rat'-and this mindset
skews the prosecutor's ability to evaluate the cooperator's credibility objectively.").
56 United States v. Stifel, 594 F. Supp. 1525, 1543 (N.D. Ohio 1984) ("[H]ad the defense
known of the November 1968 tests performed by [the expert] on tape obtained from Plymouth
Rubber Company, it could have used this evidence to further impeach the credibility of [the
expert's] scientific methods.").
57 See DWYER ET AL., supra note 11, at 125 ("Fish's misleading testimony in the Willis
case, which led to the conviction of an innocent man and allowed a predator to continue
roaming the streets, shows why the state should have turned over all of Fish's laboratory notes
and data, rather than merely presenting her final report"); Barry Scheck & Peter Neufeld,
Editorial, Junk Science, Junk Evidence, N.Y. TIMES; May 11, 2001, at A31 ("In Chicago, a
police lab analyst, Pamela Fish, left out exculpatory serological results in testimony at a 1992
rape trial, contributing to a wrongful conviction. In 1999, the defendant was exonerated by DNA
tests. Questions have now been raised about Ms. Fish's conduct in a 1986 murder case.").
58 See Troedel v. Wainwright, 667 F. Supp. 1456, 1459-60 (S.D. Fla. 1986) ("In light of
this admission, the above testimony received at the evidentiary hearing and the inconsistent
positions taken by the prosecution at Hawkins' and Troedel's trials, respectively, the Court
concludes that the opinion Troedel had fired the weapon was known by the prosecution not to
be based on the results of the neutron activation analysis tests, or on any scientific certainty or
even probability. Thus, the subject testimony was not only misleading, but also was used by the
State knowing it to be misleading."), aff'd sub nom. Troedel v. Dugger, 828 F.2d 670 (11th Cir.
1987).
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prosecutors, noted: "When it comes to disciplining a prosecutor who
commits Brady-type misconduct, . . . punishment is virtually
nonexistent. " 59
Given these realities, some stemming from the prosecution's
difficult burdens in obtaining convictions, and some peculiar to the
Brady doctrine, we should not be surprised with the present state of
affairs. 60
IV. DISCOVERY PROVISIONS

Although many scrupulous prosecutors adhere to the Brady
requirements, others have failed, and failed far too often. A better
approach is expanded discovery rules. Here, again, my experience
trying courts-mmiial cases has influenced my thinking. The military
system went beyond an "open file" system. The same case file was
given to both the prosecutor and defense attorney-and usually at the
same time. Moreover, defense attorneys had the right to interview all
prosecution witnesses who served in the Armed Forces. 61 As far as I
could tell, there were few Brady issues.
The Model Code places an ethical duty on prosecutors to disclose
favorable defense evidence. 62 Current ABA Criminal Justice
Standards require the prosecution to disclose cooperation

5 9 Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A
Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 742 (1987). See also Greshman, supra note 39, at 687
("Brady is insufficiently enforced when violations are discovered, and virtually unenforceable
when violations are hidden."); Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial
Misconduct and Wrong/ill Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L.
REV. 399, 400 ("[P]rosecutorial misconduct is largely the result of three institutional conditions:
vague ethics rules that provide ambiguous guidance to prosecutors; vast discretionary authority
with little or no transparency; and inadequate remedies for prosecutorial misconduct, which
create perverse incentives for prosecutors to engage in, rather than refrain from, prosecutorial
misconduct."); Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of
the Duty ofProsecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833, 934
(1997) ("We should not continue to permit the almost total lack of meaningful sanctions to
enforce the command of Brady to constitute our own sanction for the misconduct of our
prosecutors."); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrong/ill Convictions: It is Time to Take Prosecution
Discipline Seriously, 8 UDC/DCSL L. REv. 275,281-82 (2004).
60 Gershman, supra note 39, at 686 ("Reflecting on this landmark decision forty-three
years later, one is struck by the dissonance between Brady's grand expectations to civilize U.S.
criminal justice and the grim reality of its largely unfulfilled promise.").
61 There were typically no barriers to interviewing witnesses. I would simply telephone
the witness's commanding officer and set up a time for an interview. Of course, witnesses had
the right not to incriminate themselves, and if a witness was charged with a crime, the right to
counsel.
62 MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (governing the special responsibilities of a
prosecutor and requiring a prosecutor to "make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence
or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates
the offense .... ").
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agreements, 63 as well as exculpatory evidence,64 before trial. Some
states have comparable provisions. 65 These rules are not enough.
One court devised special rules for jailhouse informants. In Dodd
v. State, 66 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, after noting that
"[c]ourts should be exceedingly leery of jailhouse informants,
especially if there is a hint that the informant received some sm1 of a
benefit for his or her testimony," 67 went on to adopt special discovery
rules in this context:
At least ten days before trial, the state is required to disclose
in discovery: (1) the complete criminal history of the
informant; (2) any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit that
the offering party has made or may make in the future to the
informant; (3) the specific statements made by the defendant
and the time, place, and manner of their disclosure; (4) all
other cases in which the informant testified or offered
statements against an individual but was not called, whether
the statements were admitted in the case, and whether the
infonnant received any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit
in exchange for or subsequent to that testimony or statement;
(5) whether at any time the informant recanted that testimony
or statement, and if so, a transcript or copy of such
recantation; and (6) any other information relevant to the
informant's credibility .68
This is a remarkable decision. It came from the same state where
Williamson was convicted. The Canadian ("Kaufinan") Commission
in the Guy Paul Morin case also recommended extensive disclosure in
the informant context, 69 and Illinois subsequently codified this
63 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY ll2.l(a)(iii) (3d ed. 1996) ("The relationship, if any, between the prosecution and any witness it
intends to call at trial, including the nature and circumstances of any agreement, understanding
or representation between the prosecution and the witness that constitutes an inducement for the
cooperation or testimony of the witness.").
64 /d., Standard II-2.1(a)(viii).
65 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 45, § 20.3(m), at 884.
66 993 P.2d 778 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000).
67 /d. at 783.
68 Id. at 784.
69 KAUFMAN REPORT, supra note 19, Reco=endation No. 47 [Prosecutors ought to
disclose]:
(1) The criminal record of the in-custody informer including, where accessible to
the police or Crown, the synopses relating to any convictions.
(2) Any information in the prosecutors' possession or control respecting the
circumstances in which the informer may have previously testified for the Crown as
an informer, including, at a minimum, the date, location and court where the
previous testimony was given. (The police, in taking the informer's statement,
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approach in death penalty cases involving jailhouse informants. 70 Of
course, a savvy defense attorney could make a specific Brady request
for all the information mentioned in Dodd, but why should the
defendant with an inexperienced or incompetent attorney receive less
information? 71

should inquire into any prior experiences testifYing for either the provincial or
federal Crown as an informer or as a witness generally.).
(3) Any offers or promises made by police, corrections authorities, Crown counsel,
or a witness protection program to the informer or person associated with the
informer in consideration for the information in the present case.
(4) Any benefit given to the informer, members of the informer's family or any
other person associated with the informer, or any benefits sought by such persons, as
consideration for their co-operation with authorities, including but not limited to
those kinds of benefits already listed in the Crown Policy Manual.
(5) As noted earlier, any arrangements providing for a benefit (as set out above)
should, absent exceptional circumstances, be reduced to writing and signed and/or be
recorded on videotape. Such arrangements should be approved by a Director of
Crown Operations or the In-Custody Informer Committee and disclosed to the
defence prior to receiving the testimony of the witness (or earlier ... ).
(6) Copies of the notes of all police officers, corrections authorities or Crown
counsel who made, or were present during, any promises of benefits to, any
negotiations respecting benefits with, or any benefits sought by, an in custody
informer. There may be additional notes of officers or corrections authorities which
may also be relevant to the incustody informer's testimony at trial.
(7) The circumstances under which the in-custody informer and his or her
information came to the attention of the authorities.
(8) If the informer will not be called as a Crown witness, a disclosure obligation still
exists, subject to the informer's privilege.
70 That statute makes the following information discoverable:
(I) the complete criminal history of the informant;
(2) any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit that the offering party has made or
will make in the future to the informant;
(3) the statements made by the accused;
(4) the time and place of the statements, the time and place of their disclosure to law
enforcement officials, and the names of ali persons who were present when the
statements were made;
(5) whether at any time the informant recanted that testimony or statement and, if
so, the time and place of the recantation, the nature of the recantation, and the names
of the persons who were present at the recantation;
(6) other cases in which the informant testified, provided that the existence of such
testimony can be ascertained through reasonable inquiry and whether the informant
received any promise, inducement, or benefit in exchange for or subsequent to that
testimony or statement; and,
(7) any other information relevant to the informant's credibility.
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.§ 5/ll5-2l(c) (West 2004).
7 1 In Agurs, the Court wrote that failure to respond to a specific and relevant request "is
seldom, if ever, excusable." 427 U.S. at 106. It added: "[l]fthe subject matter of such a request
is material, or indeed if a substantial basis for claiming materiality exists, it is reasonable to
require the prosecutor to respond either by furnishing the information or by submitting the
problem to the trial judge." !d.
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V. WRITTEN AGREEMENTS

One of the most difficult areas to regulate involves unstated
expectations and sub rosa understandings. 72 Recall Terri Holland's
claim that she had received no benefit by testifying against Ron
Williamson. One commentator has observed:
To enhance the credibility of his testimony, an informant
often testified that there have been no promises of benefits
made to them in return for their testimony. Even though
nothing may be explicitly stated, both the prosecutor and the
informant knew that there will be some compensation for the
testimony. "The practice (of promising rewards) was done by
a wink and a nod and it was never necessary to have any kind
offormal understanding." 73
As one court wrote: "We are not unaware of the reality that the
Government has ways of indicating to witness's counsel the likely
" 74
benefits from cooperation without making bald promises .
Another court has highlighted the problem with this practice:
By allowing Thornton to testify without making any express
advance promises, the Commonwealth could presumably
craft a reward post hoc that conformed to the quality of the
service. This approach has the added advantage of permitting
a prosecutor to tout the fact to the jury that no specific
promises have been made to the witness. Needless to say, this
tactic provides a witness who faces pending charges with an
even stronger motive to lie than a witness with whom a
bargain is made before trial. 75
72 See R. Michael Cassidy, "Soft Words of Hope:" Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, and the
Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1129, 1132 (2004) ("The Court's decision
in Giglio has created an incentive for prosecutors to make representations to an accomplice
witness that are vague and open-ended~ so that they will not be considered a firm 'promise'
mandating disclosure.... Such indefinite agreements have the added advantage of allowing
prosecutors to argue to the jury that no specific promise has been made to the witness; this is
viewed as tactically more advantageous to the government because it prevents the factfinder
from second-guessing the appropriateness of concessions ultimately conferred.").
73 BLOOM, supra note 22, at 66 (citing L.A. Grand Jury Report, at 39, and Ted Rohrlich,
Perjurer Sentenced to 3 Years; Crime: Informant Blew the Whistle on Use ofJailhouse Liar-forHire, but No Law Officers Were Charged for Conspiring with Him, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1992,
at Bl (quoting Douglas Dalton, special counsel to the Los Angeles County Grand Jury)).
74 United States v. Ramirez, 608 F .2d 1261, 1266 n.9 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing United States
v. Butler, 567 F.2d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1978), and adding "conceivably Zamora's and his
counsel's protestations that the Government made no 'promises' while perhaps literally true
might have been misleading").
7 5 Commonwealth v. Davis, 751 N.E.2d 420,423 n.7 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001).
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Requiring written agreements of all deals is critical. The Kaufman
Report recommended that, in the absence of exceptional
circumstances, all agreements with in-custody informants be written
and signed by the prosecutor, the informant, and defense counsel. 76
Oral agreements, if fully reproduced on videotape, may substitute for
a written agreement. Written agreements are also the rule in federal
practice. 77
Of course, if the prosecutor claims there is no agreement, the
problem remains. The federal comts have taken different approaches
on how to deal with the problem of tacit agreements and Brady. 78 The
Sixth Circuit recently addressed the problem but the panel decision
was withdrawn for en bane review. 79 The panel wrote:
While it is theoretically possible for the prosecution to grant a
witness benefits after trial that have no com1ection to the
witness' testimony, it is more than a fair assumption that the
prosecution generally grants a witness such benefits in
exchange for his testimony. The prosecution is also not in the
business of altruism; it grants leniency to an informant
because it wants that informant's testimony, and it wants to
76

KAUFMAN REPORT, supra note 19, Recommendation 43.
Cassidy, supra note 72, at 1147 ("Although not required by statute or rule of criminal
procedure, almost all plea agreements with cooperating witnesses in federal court are put in
writing.") (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION § 9-27-450
(1993)).
78 Compare Wisehart v. Davis, 408 F.3d 321, 324 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Express or tacit, either
way there would be an agreement, it would be usable for impeachment, and it would have to be
disclosed to the defense."), and Reutter v. Solem, 888 F.2d 578, 582 (8th Cir. 1989) ("Our
conclusion does not depend on a fmding of either an express or an implied agreement between
Trygstad and the prosecution regarding the prosecution's favorable recommendation to the
parole board.... We hold that, viewed in the context of petitioner's trial, the fact of Trygstad's
impending commutation hearing was material in the Bagley sense and that petitioner therefore is
entitled to relief."), with Shabazz v. Artuz, 336 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[P]etitioner is
correct that Landers and Pullum received a benefit because they testified against him. However,
this fact, standing alone, does not establish that, prior to petitioner's trial, the District Attorney's
Office promised Landers and Pullum leniency. The government is free to reward witnesses for
their cooperation with favorable treatment in pending criminal cases without disclosing to the
defendant its intention to do so, provided that it does not promise anything to the witnesses prior
to their testimony.").
79 See Bell v. Bell, 460 F.3d 739, 753-54 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[A] tacit agreement in this
context is based on the transparent incentives for both the witness and the prosecution. The fact
is that a jailhouse informant is one of the least likely candidates for altruistic behavior; his offer
to testifY is almost always coupled with an expectation of some benefit in return. The
prosecution is not naive as to this expectation, and the prosecution also knows that when the
value of the informant's testimony reaches a sufficient level, it is in the prosecution's interest to
fulfill this expectation. At the most fundamental level, the arrangement is a quid pro quo; the
informant knows he is giving something of value and expects something in return; the
prosecution knows it is receiving something of value, and gives something in return. No written
or spoken word is required to understand the nature of this tacit agreement."), vacated, relz 'g
granted en bane.
77
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encourage other infonnants to come forward and testify. A
rule requiring disclosure of a tacit agreement regardless of
when the prosecution grants leniency recognizes this fact and
is necessary to prevent the prosecution from shirking its
Brady responsibilities by simply waiting until after the
petitioner's trial to act on the tacit agreement. 80
VI. OTHER APPROACHES
Several other approaches to the jailhouse snitch problem have been
advocated.

A. Prosecution Screening
The first (and perhaps the most important) check on unreliable
testimony by informants is the prosecutor. 81 The Canadian
("Kaufman") Commission in the Guy Paul Morin case provided a list
of factors that prosecutors should review. 82
80

Id. at 755.
See Steven M. Cohen, 1¥hat is Tnte? Perspectives of a Former Prosecutor, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 817, 827-28 (2002).
82 Recommendation 41. [In assessing the reliability of in-custody informers, prosecutors
should consider:
(I) The extent to which the statement is confirmed ... ;
(2) The specificity of the alleged statement. For example, a claim that the accused
said "1 killed A.B." is easy to make but extremely difficult for any accused to
disprove;
(3) The extent to which the statement contains details or leads to the discove1y of
evidence known only to the perpetrator;
(4) The extent to which the statement contains details or leads which could
reasonably be accessed by the in-custody informer, other than through inculpatory
statements by the accused.... Crown counsel should be mindful that, historically,
some informers have shown great ingenuity in securing information thought to be
unaccessible to them. Furthermore, some informers have converted details
communicated by the accused in the context of an exculpatory statement into details
which purport to prove the making of an inculpatory statement;
(5) The informer's general character, which may be evidenced by his or her
criminal record or other disreputable or dishonest conduct known to the authorities;
(6) Any request the informer has made for benefits or special treatment (whether or
not agreed to) and any promises which may have been made (or discussed with the
informer) by a person in authority in connection with the provision of the statement
or an agreement to testify;
(7) Whether the informer has, in the past, given reliable information to the
authorities;
(8) Whether the informer has previously claimed to have received statements while
in custody. This may be relevant not only to the informer's reliability or unreliability
but, more generally, to the issue of whether the public interest would be served by
utilizing a recidivist informer who previously traded infmmation for benefits;
(9) Whether the informer has previously testified in any court proceeding, whether
as a witness for the prosecution or the defence or on his or her behalf, and any
fmdings in relation to the accuracy and reliability of that evidence, if known;
81
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Judge Trott has also provided step-by-step guidance for
prosecutors. His fundamental message, however, is don't use
jailhouse informants and, if you do, "Corroborate eve1ything you
can." 83
B. Corroboration Requirement

Skepticism about the reliability of accomplice testimony has led
many jurisdictions to require corroboration as a condition for a
conviction. 84 A significant number mandate this requirement by
statute. 85 The ABA recently adopted a resolution recommending that
the corroboration rule be extended to jailhouse snitch testimony. 86
C. Jury Instructions

Cautionary jury instructions are another possibility. Such
instructions are often used with accomplice testimony. 87 There Is,

(I 0) Whether the informer made some written or other record of the words allegedly
spoken by the accused and, if so, whether the record was made contemporaneous to
the alleged statement of the accused;
(ll)The circumstances under which the informer's report of the alleged statement
was taken (e.g. report made immediately after the statement was made, report made
to more than one officer, etc);
(12)The manner in which the report of the statement was taken by the police (e.g.
through use of non-leading questions, through report of words spoken by the
accused, through investigation of circumstances which might suggest opportunity or
lack of opportunity to fabricate a statement) .... ;
(13)Any other known evidence that may attest to or diminish the credibility of the
informer, including the presence or absence of any relationship between the accused
and the informer;
(14) Any relevant information contained in any available registry of informers.
KAUFMAN REPORT, supra note 19, Recommendation No. 39 ("Confirmation should be defined
as credible evidence or information, available to the Crown, independent of the in-custody
informer, which significantly supports the position that the inculpatory aspects of the proposed
evidence were not fabricated. One in-custody informer does not provide confrrmation for
another.").
83 Trott, supra note 1, at 1427.
84 See, e.g., Humber v. State, 466 So. 2d 165 (Ala. Crirn. App. 1985) (citing statute); State
v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tenn. 2001) ("In Tennessee, a conviction may not be based
solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.").
85 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.020 (Michie 2004); ARK.. CODE ANN. § 16-89-ll!E
(Michie 2003); CAL. PENAL CODE § Ill (Deering 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-8 (2003);
NEV. REV. STAT.§ 175.291 (2004); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 60.22 (Consol. 2004); OKLA. STAT. tit.
22 § 742 (2004); OR. REv. STAT. § 136.440 (2003). Eighteen states require corroboration of an
accomplice's testimony.
86 INNOCENCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 63.
87 In Banks v. Dretke, Justice Ginsburg, speaking for seven Justices, observed:
The jury, moreover, did not benefit from customary, truth-promoting precautions that
generally accompany the testimony of informants. This Court has long recognized
the "serious questions of credibility" informers pose. On Lee v. United States, 343
U.S. 747, 757 (1952). See also Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using
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however, great variability regarding special jury instructions. 88 In
some jurisdictions, a cautionary instruction is not required where
there is corroboration of accomplice testimony. For example, in
Virginia, in the absence of corroboration, it is the duty of the court to
give a cautionary instruction. 89 In Mississippi, cautionary instructions
are discretionary, but that discretion can be abused where the state's
evidence rests solely on accomplice testimony and there is some
question as to the reasonableness and consistency of that testimony. 90
In Utah, giving a cautionary instruction generally falls within the
discretion of the court, but it must be given if the judge fmds the
testimony "self-contradictory, uncertain or improbable."91 Federal
cases set forth various versions of such instructions, some using the
language "particular caution" and others employing phrases such as
"great caution" or "great caution and care."92
Special cautionary instructions should be given whenever there is
accomplice or informant testimony, whether corroborated or not and
regardless of other factors. 93 Here, again, Dodd v. State is the

Criminals as Witnesses, 47 Hastings L. J. 1381, 1385 (1996) ("Jurors suspect
[informants'] motives from the moment they hear about them in a case, and they
frequently disregard their testimony altogether as highly untrustworthy and
unreliable .... "). We have therefore allowed defendants "broad latitude to probe
[informants'] credibility by cross-examination" and have counseled submission of
the credibility issue to the jury "with careful instructions." On Lee, 343 U.S. at 757;
accord, Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311-312 (1966). See also lA K.
O'Malley, J. Grenig, & W. Lee, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal §
15.02 (5th ed. 2000) (jury instructions from the First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits on special caution appropriate in assessing informant
testimony).
540 U.S. 668,701-02 (2004).
88 See State v. May, 339 So. 2d 764, 775 (La. 1976) ("As a general principle of Louisiana
law, a conviction can be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of a purported accomplice,
although the jury should be instructed to treat such testimony with great caution.").
89 See Smith v. Commonwealth, 237 S.E.2d 776, 777 (Va. 1977) ("[T]he accomplice's
testimony was not sufficiently corroborated, and it was error to refuse a cautionary
instruction.").
90 See Slaughterv. State, 815 So. 2d 1122, 1134 (Miss. 2002).
91 UTAH CODE ANN.§ 77-17-7 (2004).
92 See, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 244 F.3d 784, 789 (lOth Cir. 200!) ("weighed with
great care, and received with caution"); United States v. Prawl, 168 F.3d 622, 629 (2d Cir.
1999) ("weighed by you with great care"); United States v. Garcia Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, !53
(5th Cir. 1998) ("greater caution than other testimony"); United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d
1522, 1538 (9th Cir. 1988) ("great caution and care").
93 Research indicates that the timing of the instruction is important-i.e., instructions
close in time to the admission of the evidence are more effective. See SAUL M. KASSIN &
LAWRENCE S. WRJGHTSMAN, THE AMERlCAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
145 (1988) ("These data demonstrate that adherence to judges' instructions might hinge on their
placement within the trial. 'Better late than never' may apply to some areas of life, but not to the
practice of instructing juries."). See also Amiram Elwork & Bruce D. Sales, Jury Instructions, in
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 280, 291 (Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence
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landmark case. The court required a jury instruction specific to
jailhouse informants. 94
D. Expert Testimony

Sometimes courts have allowed expert testimony to enlighten
jurors about police procedures that may generate suspect evidence.
Eyewitness identifications 95 and false confessions are examples. 96 In
State v. DuBray, 97 the Montana Supreme Court ruled that the trial
court had not abused its discretion in excluding expert testimony
regarding the credibility of incarcerated informants. The trial court
had precluded the testimony because (1) it would have invaded the
province of the jury, (2) it was mmecessary because the notion of
ptisoners bartering testimony in exchange for favorable treatment is
generally understood by lay persons, and (3) the accused had the
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses regarding their possible
motivations. 98 As noted above, however, cross-examination will only
be effective if counsel has all the pertinent information concerning
any cooperation agreement, which is often not the case.
CONCLUSION

Brady often fails because the Supreme Court undercut the
prosecutor's obligation by adding a stringent materiality requirement,
which an accused must satisfy to establish a due process violation.

S. Wrightsman eds., 1985) ("Although there is no empirical data on this, it is logical to assume
that such instructions [limited purpose] are properly timed. That is, these instructions are
probably most effective when they are presented in the immediate context of the evidence or
procedures to which they apply.").
94 993 P.2d 778, 784 (Okla. Crirn. App. 2000):
The testimony of an informer who provides evidence against a defendant must be
examined and weighed by you with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary
witoess. Whether the informer's testimony has been affected by interest or prejudice
against the defendant is for you to determine. In making that determination, you
should consider: (l) whether the witoess has received anything (including pay,
immunity from prosecution, leniency in prosecution, personal advantage, or
vindication) in exchange for testimony; (2) any other case in which the informant
testified or offered statements against an individual but was not called, and whether
the statements were admitted in the case, and whether the informant received any
deal, promise, inducement, or benefit in exchange for that testimony or statement; (3)
whether the informant has ever changed his or her testimony; (4) the criminal history
of the informant; and (5) any other evidence relevant to the informer's credibility.
95 See 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD 1. IMwlNKELREID, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE§ 9-2
(4th ed. 2007) (discussing cases).
96 Id, § 9-9 (discussing cases).
97 77 P.3d 247 (Mont. 2003).
98 !d. at 256.
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Given this doctrinal banier, a better approach focuses on an expanded
discovery rule along the lines set forth by the court in Dodd

